Groundwater Governance: Moving Away from a Tragedy of the Commons

For anybody who hasn’t read Garrett Hardin’s (1968) ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, I thoroughly recommend it, and to anybody who has, take a deep breath and don’t panic, I have no plans on reaching similar doom and gloom conclusions here today. Indeed, as my fans have been quick to inform me, my tone towards African surface water governance has been, at best a lucid description of the water in which it seems to be drowning. Today my mood is not so downtrodden, however before explaining why, we cannot ignore the detrimental impacts that a precedent coined ‘a tragedy of open access’ has shown in the Asian region towards groundwater either (Bromley; Grafton 2000). It is this juncture that I will address today, as the fundamental crux that comes before any other technical or practical limitations is the difficulty in assigning (or not) property rights (Dalhuisen et al. 2000). If appropriate frameworks or alternative criteria, can be established for deciphering ownership rights, then groundwater can unquestionably help alleviate predictions made by the AdDB that 25 African countries in 2025 will suffer a ‘chronic shortage’ of water (AfDB 2005).

As has been well documented, things become more complicated when aquifer boundaries do not correlate to those of the overlying jurisdictions, and as illustrated in Struckmeier et al’s (2006) map below, this happens a lot in Africa.

 Outside of aquifer usage, as political ecology has taken on a distinctly commodified approach, it is understandable that most attempts to conceptualise the legalities concerning common resources have looked at ways to align proportionate empirical inputs to reflect the entitlements of use for single parties, and as such single benefits. In other words, to somehow (and one would argue paradoxically) apportion private property rights to a common resource.

Accurately delineating the physical make up of an aquifer to designate certain parts of the process to specific stakeholders is, not only a very difficult thing to practice with sub-surface water resources, but not the only available way that transboundary water disputes can be resolved (Comte et al. 2016). We only need to look at how Northern Sudan has welcomed the idea of the GERD in Ethiopia immediately across its border to see how benefit sharing can be a solution, reflective of wider opinions that Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM is based on the natural boundaries of the basin not jurisdiction) is a much better way that relying on the jurisdictional confines. However, in order for theis kinds of more collaborative conduct towards groundwater resources to be realized, growing on the last post, a more mature

a.) Integration of groundwater governance methods with other water management institutions needs to be continued (eg. Surface water, pollution management)

b.) And as such, this can help reconcile a central strategy of action between all involved stakeholders markedly improving the efficiency of output with mutually reinforcing governance actions

(Braune and Xu 2010; Knuppe 2011)

Efforts to facilitate IWRM has been encouraged by The Global Water Partnership and World Water Council who in their findings have cited cross sector dialogues within government being the most important primary steps to take in establishing common requirements (Foster et al. 2012). Projects to integrate IWRM in sub-saharan Africa are underway and not before time as a platform for coordinating this enhancing integration of sectoral interests is a limiting factor (UNEP 2012, Mehta and Movik 2014). There is no doubt that the perceived importance of such co-operative measures will continue to increase when there is both an increased proliferation of the scientific endeavors that have helped heighten the social consciousness of unsustainable abstraction practice, and increasing realization amongst communities of the alleviation that groundwater extraction can continue to bring in SSA; increasing awareness and participation amongst local communities has demonstrated itself as being key in groundwater concerns being taken seriously as debates percolate up through the different tropic levels of governance power, with the coastal aquifer on the coast of Tanzania and Kenya proving itself to be a case in point  (Comte et al. 2016).

However, the ability to reconcile national policy and sustainable attitiudes towards groundwater through local action requires as yet unseen levels of governance sophistication. This shows that the emergent progress of institutions like the Global Water Partnership in co-ordinating,, the work of the scientific communities in elucidating the technical understanding and abstraction requirements, and the work of NGO’s in facilitating it can all improve. Embeding these fundamental principles in to institutional constellations is necessary for good governance practice and integration of groundwater going forward.

Bibliography

Braune, E. & Xu, Y., 2010. The Role of Ground Water in Sub‐Saharan Africa. Ground Water, 48(2), pp.229–238.

Comte et al., 2016. Challenges in groundwater resource management in coastal aquifers of East Africa: Investigations and lessons learnt in the Comoros Islands, Kenya and Tanzania. Journal of Hydrology: Regional Studies, 5, pp.179–199.

Grafton, Q. (2000): Governance of the commons: a role for the state?, in: Land Economics 76 (4), 504–17

Mehta, L. et al., 2014. The politics of IWRM in Southern Africa. International Journal of Water Resources Development, pp.1–15.

Struckmeier W. et al. (2006): WHYMAP and the World Map of Transboundary Aquifer Systems at the scale of 1 : 50 000 000, Special edition for the 4th World Water Forum, Mexico City, March

UNEP (2012) The UN-Water Status Report on the Application of Integrated Approaches to Water Resources Management: UNEP Division of Communications and Public Information, Nairobi, Kenya

Transboundary Groundwater Governance: Information deficits, Incentives and barriers to cooperation

Transboundary Groundwater Governance: Information deficits, Incentives and barriers to cooperation

The main point I would like to draw upon here is simple: ‘Given the present stage of resource utilization, groundwater mismanagement has not yet become critical enough to compel decision makers to engage in joint endeavors (except in North Africa).’ These remarks, made by the German Development Institute (GDI) (2008: 76) nearly 10 years ago, are in my opinion, increasingly invalid in terms of resource utilization. Appraisals of effectiveness regarding many prominent transnational surface water initiatives, such as the NBI being ‘excrutiatingly slow’ and ‘seemingly unsuccessful’ (Paisley et al. 2013:11), alongside increasing needs to move beyond existing and strained sources through development pressures, point towards the need to diversify water requirements through groundwater. Yet the GDI’s appraisal of the seeming lack of groundwater governance was attributed to the costs of non co-operation: It seems unfeasible to under utilize this resource any longer.

However, the recognisations by academics of the growing importance of groundwater as a resource does not seem to be replicated by a similar proliferation of governance in Africa. Specified knowledge of individual aquifer complilation needs to improve to help inform a chronic lack of management institutions. Although not totally realised, efforts to combat this are ongoing, evident through formations like that of the ‘Joint Authority for the Study and Development of the Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System’ (a real mouthful) and the Consultation mechanism of the North-West Saharan Aquifer System. There still remains a knowledge gap concerning aquifer dynamics in various specific sites and as a trend in Africa more broadly, a lack of knowledge makes it difficult to enact governance strategies, as they cannot be sure of;

-       Whether or not their country forms part of a groundwater basin, and if so to what extent?

-       If they do, the degree to which they have a stake, and thus an incentive to co-operate

-       If they do form part of the basin, what is at stake by co-operating, or not?

The last question has proved to be mutual reinforcing as uncertainty understandably favours a continuation of the status quo. In conjunction with this, Africa more than any other country in the world has a very unequal distribution of economic development which translates into asymmetric distributions of information. This is believed to be a limiting factor in so far as more developed countries feel they would be required to put in disproportionate inputs for the benefits received (Steyrer, 2008). Reinforcing this, Jarvis has noted that pure institutional convenience can be understood as a pull factor in establishing aquifer management schemes as he goes on to note that 14/40 acknowledged transboundary aquifers fall ‘inside a river basin with some form of freshwater agreement’ (2007:76)

However, in line the remarks made at the outset, the opposite also applies, in that countries who have a heavy reliance on groundwater have actively been the forerunners in searching for the establishment of cooperation platforms and institutions. Tunisia is one such example and their precarious position with regards to their high dependence on the Rejim Maatoug aquifer in particular has seen significant efforts to demonstrate how they would be easy and beneficial to work with – reflected by their own efforts to display both good water policy and a consistent implementation of it. Their efforts seem to have been recognised as they consistently score the highest on the corruption perception index (scoring highest means you have the lowest, I know don’t) has seen their initiation of the successfully established OSS (Observatory of the Sahara and the Sahel) to ‘co-ordinate promote rational management’ (Burchi and Mechlem 2005:7) North-West Sahara Aquifer System Algeria and Libya with research being the name of the day, the initial focus reflective of the continued limitations that effective groundwater process knowledge has on good governance.

Subsequently, many aquifer management systems still seem in very early stages of development and increasingly matured efforts are being made to mediate the legal difficulties that have accompanied the increased uses of groundwater resources.

Bibliography

Burchi, S. / K. Mechlem (2005): Groundwater in international law: Compilation of treaties and other legal instruments, Rome: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO Legislative Study 86)

German Development Institute (2008): Conceptualising Cooperation for Africa’s transboundary groundwater resources)

Jarvis, W. T. (2007): Transboundary groundwater: geopolitical consequences, commons sense, and the law of the hidden sea, Dissertation; online: http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/jarvisdissertation.htm (accessed 2 Aug. 2007)

K. Paisley & Henshaw, 2013. Transboundary governance of the Nile River Basin: Past, present and future. Environmental Development, 7, pp.59–71.

Steyrer, T. (2007): Transboundary groundwater management – non-African case studies

The NBI II: Detached From Ecological Reality?

Although the NBI has been lauded as a constructive move in de-escalating riparian tensions of increasing evidence from the 1980’s onwards, there are critiques as to its practicality as the singular functioning model. From a conceptual standpoint, critics including Ashok Swain (2002) have pointed to historical evidence suggesting that an integration of a sub-basin model would help the initiative to avoid micro management and disincentivisation, and thus be more appropriate than the NBI alone, which still partitions water rights based on ‘ecologically arbitrary’ (Wolfenson, 2001), boundaries of state borders. As he elucidates, to develop the full economic potential of the river it would be more optimal to regard the river based on a collection of supplementary basins, that should be regarded as individual units in their own rights, irrespective of state boundaries.

 As illustrated on the right hand side, we can see that the Nile distinctly partitions between

catchments. From this point of view, as Swain suggests, it is inefficient for example, to have countries in the tributaries of the White Nile (upstream; SB 1,2,4) be concerned with the usage patterns of a disconnected basin, namely that of the Blue Nile tributaries (SB6,7). As it stands, this is not the case, and a total consensus from all 10 riparian states is required to act on all issues throughout the basin.

However, is not an alternative without limitations as none of the Nile’s hydrological catchment is in Egypt even though the country has historically used the majority of the discharge. Although Egypt’s longstanding reliance on ‘acquired rights’ has become an increasingly tenuous defence in recent years, this doesn’t mean that moving forward their requirements can be dismissed at the expense of burgeoning upstream development initiatives. A singular sub basin approach would inevitably cause political fractures that the NBI has been established deter. Furthermore, with all of the countries on the Nile having agriculture economies as their primary sectors ‘irrigation has therefore become the cornerstone of food security’ (Swain, 2002: p.299), and is not surprising that downstream neighbours will be concerned with the actions of those in upstream basins, irrelevant of how ecologically removed they may first immediately appear. Therefore, to dismiss the conceptual relevance of the NBI as but a dream of bureaucratic actuality would be foolish, as a formal touchpoint for multilateral negotiations does have serious potential, even in an age where large institutions do not seem to be the flavour of the month, it seems to be a question of execution rather than of concept.

So in order to retain the value of a transboundary body whilst being effective, fluid chains of commands need to be established at varying scales so that the most pressing issues receive the lion’s share of resources in management solutions as the NBI in its infancy has demonstrated a cumbersome method of consensus and implication of projects (Sadoff, 2005). It is no secret that multilateral progress is deeply intertwined with incentives, and examples of China and Burma in the Mekong Basin, abstaining from regional co-operation is a timely reminder of how the NBI may be better placed to advocate ‘benefit sharing’ strategies as opposed to traditional ideas of ‘water sharing’ (Sadoff, 2002; Mason, 2004; Ndunda, 2006). As they receive no benefits from resource management schemes within their state borders, China and Burma have been resistant to transboundary co-operation. To further this point in relation to the Nile, the critical juncture seems to be how Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia can co-operate: unless Sudan and Ethiopia are incentivised by Egypt by some other means, a political impasse looks set to remain. 

References:

James Wolfensohn, “Rich Nations Can Remove World Poverty as a Source of

Conflict,” International Herald Tribune, 6 October 2001.

Swain, A. (2002) The Nile Basin Initiative: Too Many Cooks Too Little Broth : SAIS review Volume 22, Issue 2, pp.293-308

Sadoff, C.W., Grey, D., (2002), Beyond the river: the benefits of cooperation on

International rivers : “Water Policy”, no. 4

Mason, S. A., (2004), From Conflict to Cooperation in the Nile Basin, Zurich: Swiss

Federal Institute of Technology

Ndunda, E., (2006), States to sign Nile Accord Next Month, in: “The Standard”, no. 21,

November